MEASURING RADICALISM AND TERRORISM NETWORKS IN ACEH, INDONESIA

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Abstract

This article aims to elaborate on the spread of radicalism and terrorism networks in the Aceh region. The development of radicalism in Aceh is more due to a former conflict area that is very vulnerable to being provoked. The presence of former combatants from the Free Aceh Movement potentially produces new cadres to expand the terrorism network. The cause of radicalism is more due to the development of jihadist recitation nodes. Besides, economic factors have contributed to accelerating the spread of radicalism. Meanwhile, the process of preventing radicalism in the Aceh region is still not running optimally because prevention efforts are only focused on communication forums and have not synergized among elements. This study uses a descriptive qualitative method with an in-depth interview. This article argues that the spread of radicalism in Aceh is due to factors in the former conflict areas and the lack of attention from local governments to take early prevention. This article also argues that cooperation from local, central, and civil society nodes is needed to work together to carry out strategies to prevent radicalism.

Key words: Aceh, radicalism, terrorism

INTRODUCTION

Radicalism is still a serious threat to the life sustainability of the nation. In this context, radicalism emerges from a cloistered, fanatical, textual, and rigid understanding of religion that often produces wrong perceptions. For example, judging only one group is the best, while others are frequently considered infidel or heretical. It should be noted that radicalism is often linear with terrorism. Meanwhile, the definition of terrorism emerged in the 19th century. Initially, the term was used to describe government actions in the French revolution, which used brutal and excessive force by beheading 40,000 people accused of being anti-government. In the Indonesian context, radicalism has continued to increase over the last 10 years in government and community institutions to the world of education. In the past few years, Indonesia has faced acts of terrorism through suicide bombings. This series of acts of terrorism

shows that the graph of radicalism development is still growing today. If traced, in Indonesia, the spread of radicalism has targeted several areas that can be used as the basis for the formation of new cadres.

If it refers to the graphic of the distribution of radical groups in Indonesia based on data from the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the threat of radicalism comes from 1,500 people divided into small groups that excuse religion. They are called the pro-ISIS faction in Indonesia such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), Jamaah Ansharut Khilafah (JAK), the East Indonesian Mujahidin (MIT), the West Indonesian Mujahidin (Kumparan.com, 2020). The recurrence of acts of terror is not due to the weakening of the terrorism law but must be seen as the failure of the de-radicalization process of terrorist convicts. Moreover, until now, the de-radicalization carried out by the BNPT and Penitentiary Institutions has failed since the suicide bombing at the Poso Police Office in Central Sulawesi in 2003. The suicide bombing at the Solo Police Headquarters and the exodus of former terrorist convicts to Syria and Mindanao reflect the failure of the de-radicalization program launched by the government in preventing terrorism in Indonesia.

However, radicalism is not the same as terrorism. According to Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2013), radicalism is more related to models of attitudes and ways of expressing one's religion, whereas terrorism includes criminal acts for political purposes only. Radicalism is more related to internal religious programs, while terrorism is a global phenomenon that requires global action. But radicalism can sometimes turn into terrorism even though it is not all and forever (Fanani, 2013). However, according to Rizal Sukma's analysis, radicalism is a stage leading to acts of terrorism. In general, terrorists carry out many destructive actions, and suicide bombings have a radical understanding of various things, especially religious matters. It is because the differences between the two are very thin (Maulana, 2017). Apart from that, many terrorists legitimize their actions through their radical religious beliefs.

The emergence of the spread of radicalism is due to the involvement factor of a person in a movement, namely contact with someone who has previously been in the movement's network (Zurcher & Olson, 1980). Furthermore, many scholars distinguish the existence of two kinds of links to movements, namely formal and informal ties (Della Porta 1988; Mc Adam & Paulsen 1993). In this context, formal ties refer to membership in the organization. Informal ties refer more to interpersonal relationships such as family, friendship, and other social contacts. In other words, according to a study by Azca (2002), those who participate in the jihad movement have previously been involved in the Islamic movement, although through different networks and with varying levels of involvement.

Furthermore, in social processes that lead to involvements in particular radical Islamic movements, informal relationships are an important factor, particularly through peer-networks and family networks. After being involved in specific Islamic movements, including moderate and pluralist ones, they later joined the radical jihad movement after going through a micro-sociological process or what is known as "reasoning" (Azca, 2013). Besides, the spread of radicalism is also greatly influenced by economic factors, especially poverty (Asrori, 2015). It is because many former terrorists have not changed their lives, which then causes them to return

to their communities as before. After all, there is a guarantee of life. In the contemporary context, the spread of radicalism is also greatly influenced by social media as a very effective participatory channel because it has many advantages where radical groups can exploit to spread radicalism, propagate propaganda, and attract as many new cadres as possible (Arianto, 2020). It means that advances in digital technology and online media support have helped the propaganda and radicalization of new ISIS/IS supporters and sympathizers in Indonesia (Nainggolan, 2016). In other words, the role of social media is to be the best channel for radical groups to continue to influence the minds of the millennial generation to follow their teachings.

It means that advances in information technology experienced by the entire world community do not necessarily suppress radicalism development. On the contrary, advances in information technology have developed radicalism and have increased various acts of terrorism. It shows that acts of terrorism from the radicalism movement are significantly influenced by information technology and social media. This social media channel is one of the channels that terrorist groups can use to spread radicalism. It confirms several statements by several actors who stated that they knew and joined the radicalism movement through social media and information technology. Moreover, currently based on the results of a poll conducted by the Association of Indonesian Internet Service Providers (APJII), the number of internet users in Indonesia has grown 10.12 or as many as 171.17 million or around 64.8 percent connected to the internet (Kompas. com, 2019).

This study focuses on the Aceh region that is allegedly used for the spread of radicalism because Aceh has been known to be one of the areas that has been implementing Islamic law. Based on a survey by the NGO Lazuardi Biru Aceh, Aceh is one of the three provinces most prone to acts of terrorism apart from West Java and Banten. The survey results also describe the Vulnerability Index for Radicalism and Terrorism in Indonesia in 33 provinces during June-July 2011. Aceh occupies the highest position at 56.8, followed by West Java and Banten, which have the same vulnerability index of 46.6. Furthermore, five years later, the BNPT said that Aceh was a red zone or prone to terrorism until 2020, the potential for terrorism in Aceh was still high.

Another factor is the dramatic political transformation in Indonesia's Aceh province. In the 1950s, the Islamic rebellion (Darul Islam) was intended not to separate Aceh from Indonesia but to make Indonesia an Islamic state. The successor movement from the 1970s is GAM, the Free Aceh Movement. GAM, by its very nature secular-nationalist orientation, seeks Acehnese independence and does not support formal Islamic goals. This transformation is explained by various factors but the key argument has to do with the relationship between Islam and nationalism. The defeat of the Darul Islam has caused Acehnese Islamic leaders to focus on their ideals which ultimately led to Acehnese nationalism and the goal of secession (Aspinall, 2007).

The existence of a terrorist group in Aceh is really surprising because Aceh has been known to be immune and has resistant to all terrorism-related movements. After GAM, Aceh turned out to be turned into a military training centre for radical groups and terrorism in the name of Islam. In March 2010, there was a shootout between the police and a terrorist group in Aceh. For more

than two weeks, there was gunfire in which dozens of suspected terrorists were arrested. Some of the victims were killed both by the police and terrorist groups. After the siege, the police continued to carry out routine raids and arrests of suspected terrorists. The armed conflict between the security forces and terrorist armed groups has raised many concerns that Aceh will be trapped in the conflict again after the signing of the MoU Helsinki peace agreement. There are concerns that this incident will destroy peace in Aceh and raise questions about its relationship with the former GAM.

Furthermore, this raises the question of whether the Aceh conflict has "transformed" from a separatist movement into a terrorism movement. During the conflict, GAM tried to avoid labelling Islam from the international community of their movements. Even from the beginning, GAM never put forward the ideological-religious aspect as the basis for its activities because the image formed in the international community regarding GAM is more of a secessionist movement based on ethno nationalism. As a result, the efforts of some parties in Jakarta at that time to portray GAM as a terrorist movement, especially after the September 11 incident, did not succeed in changing national and international public opinion. As a result, GAM is still seen as an armed separatist movement.

In subsequent developments, terrorism in Aceh turned out to be not related to the Aceh conflict problem, both to GAM and separatism. Some figures who are considered to have links to terrorist groups in Aceh come from outside Aceh. They made Aceh a base for military training because they assumed that Aceh would benefit their movement. This assumption turned out to be wrong because the then Governor (Irwandi) firmly stated that the terrorist group had nothing to do with Aceh or former GAM (Tempo.com, 2010). However, then the terrorist group has succeeded in recruiting Acehnese youth themselves. It shows that there are conditions that allow for the penetration of radical ideology and terrorism into Acehnese society even though the concept of struggle with the terrorism model cannot be accepted by young activists in Banda Aceh city. They have understood Islamic teachings that are relatively comprehensive and proportional. However, their aspiration for the establishment of Islamic law in Aceh is a necessity (Amiruddin, 2014).

In this way, the questions arise; why Aceh seems to have changed from a GAM separatist base to a terrorist base and the Islamic State of Indonesia? Is Aceh's specificity in implementing Islamic Shari'at in the field of government and some practices of the public sector being the cause for the strengthening of radicalism? As the international terrorist movement, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) strengthens, will Aceh also become the gateway or base for the ISIS movement in Southeast Asia? What should the people and government do in preventing the spread of radicalism and terrorism networks in Aceh? Some of those questions then become the background of this study. In the end, these problems become the answer to all questions regarding the spread of radicalism and terrorism networks in the Aceh region.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Terrorism

Terrorism that is currently developing is nothing new because the series of events have illustrated that acts of terrorism have been developing for a long time, especially in Indonesia. Thus, until now, terrorism has become one of the challenges and threats to national resilience (Mubarak, Z. (2013). Terrorism is an act of causing fear by committing violence to achieve particular goals. Apart from that, terrorism is an understanding that argues that the use of violence and intimidation creates anxiety and fear (Junaid, 2013).

In other words, there will be many factors behind the emergence of terrorism, such as religious factors, psychological factors, economic factors, political factors, and sociological factors (Majid, 2014). The radicalism movement in Indonesia began in the 1950s that included several phases. It began with the emergence of the Kartosoewirjo DI/ TII movement. The second phase emerged from the Komando Jihad movement from the 1970s to the 1980s, where some of the actors were former DI / TII members. The third phase is known as the post-reform terror movement in the late 1990s. The fourth phase was marked by the development of new radical groups influenced by global movements such as ISIS (Aji, 2013).

In this context, the definition of terrorism comes from the Latin language, namely Terrere (trembling) and Deterrere (fear). In English, terrorism means (threats of) violent action for political purposes. Several other observations assess that terrorism is all forms of violence with political motives (Ruby, 2002; Cooper, 2001). Some consider terrorism as a deliberate act or threat to intimidate innocent people (Primoratz, 1990). Even so, there are many versions in describing the definition of terrorism because each organization interprets it (Bruce, G. (2013).

Meanwhile, according to the Indonesian Dictionary, terrorism is defined as violent action to cause fear to achieve both terror and political goals. In this case, someone who commits terror is often referred to as a terrorist. Furthermore, the United States Department of State defines terrorism as planned, politically motivated, and violence directed against unarmed targets by splinter groups or underground agents. Usually, it aims to influence people. The driving factors for terrorism are not solely for the benefit of individuals. It means that several factors are behind terrorism, such as psychological, economic, political, religious, and sociological. Furthermore, the Oxford School Dictionary & Thesaurus dictionary states that terror is an effort to create deep fear by a person or group. Terrorists are people who use violence to create fear, usually for political purposes. Terrorism is the use of violence to create fear in achieving goals. In other words, terrorism also uses several main strategies in carrying out its actions with various cues such as friction and intimidation to excessive provocation (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Meanwhile, the Department of State's Department of Studies and Research Division defines terrorism as high-level acts of violence committed by individuals and international groups in the name of religious ideology to the greater community. However, recently the term right-wing terrorism has also become known. According to a new Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report published on Wednesday, there has been a 709 percent increase in deaths from "right-wing terrorism" in the last five years. Meanwhile, there was a 15 percent decrease in deaths due to other terrorism,

including by radical Islamic groups in 2019 compared to the previous year. Right-wing terrorism tends to be more deadly than left-wing terrorism, but not as deadly as Islamic terrorism in the West. The report noted that far-right extremists were responsible for 89 deaths in 2019, with 51 of them occurring in a mosque attack in Christchurch City, New Zealand (voaindonesia.com, 2020).

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses descriptive qualitative methods, and the objects are the perpetrators of terrorism originating in Aceh. Data collection techniques used in-depth interviews (in-depth-interview) with figures that have assisted the author in collecting data concerning radicalism and terrorism in Aceh from 2018 to 2020 in the Aceh region. Besides, researchers make direct observations to the object of research to obtain appropriate and perfect data. The conversation data were then analyzed, especially regarding the process of spreading radicalism and terrorism networks in Aceh. Searching for documentation is by studying literature and reading books, newspapers, and the internet related to radicalism and terrorism. The informants came from elements of government, BNPT, youth and community leaders, religious leaders, academics, and other parties categorized as radicals or terrorists. This research is also supported by various data related to the spread of radicalism and terrorism networks in Aceh.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Mapping of Terrorism Networks in Aceh

The spread of radicalism in the Aceh region is quite phenomenal because it is a former conflict area and radicalism spreads massively and hard to control. This study elaborates on several former terrorists who describe the spread of the terrorism movement in the Aceh region.

Starting from Tengku Faisal Ali[1], who considered that in the view of Dayah ulama, when viewed from the root of the problem, radicalism comes from ideology and fundamental things. Ideology is then often linked with faith. It means that radical nature does not come from differences in fiqh but a different understanding of theology. Therefore, the Acehnese ulama at every opportunity (Muzakarah) always appealed to the Ulama and Dayah leaders to help strengthen the community about understanding moderate ideology.

In this context, the very moderate ideology is the ideology of Ash'ariah and Maturidiyah. Historically, Ash'ariyah is a belief in the creed attributed to Abu Al Hasan Al Asy'ariy. He was born in Basrah in 260 AH to coincide with the year 935 AD and died in Basrah in 324 AH at the age of more than 40 years. The background for the birth of this sect is almost the same as the Asy'ariyah sect, namely as a reaction to the rejection of the Mu'tazila teachings. Abu Mansur Al Maturidi was born around the middle of the 3rd century AH in Maturid, a small town in the Samarkand Tarsoxiana area in Central Asia and nowadays known as Uzbekistan. He died in 333 H/944 AD. The ideology of Asya`ariyah and Maturidiyah is Tawasuth in nature or the middle or in between two attitudes, not too hard (fundamentalist) and too free (liberalism). With these attitudes, Islam can be accepted at all levels of society.

In the context of Aceh, the role of Islamic Boarding Schools or Dayah is to be one of the targets that radicalism and terrorism groups will infiltrate. Tengku Faisal Ali mentions that pesantren could be the target of this group. Usually, they use symbols under the guise of religion, but they aim to attract Islamic boarding schools as a place for radicalism. In this case, the leaders of Islamic boarding schools or Dayah must be able to read the signs and movements. It means that early detection is necessary so that radicalism groups no longer try to enter. But now, radicalism groups are building their Islamic boarding schools because many pesantren have a moderate understanding which is difficult to infiltrate.

Furthermore, Prof. Yusni Sabi[2] states that the terrorism movement in Jalin Aceh is a weakness of the government. However, the entry of terrorist groups is because they consider the Aceh region to be an area that is easy to provoke due to a former conflict area. However, the conflicts are generally originated from radical religious preaching and statements from controversial politicians. So, disharmony often occurs. It means that the disharmonious relationship between these elites also has a great contribution to the proliferation of radical attitudes from communities or community elements. In other words, the notion of radicalism or terrorism in Aceh emerged from the attitudes or policies of the government, the policies of religious leaders who were not vigilant, and unwise or sincere in dealing with differences in society.

Furthermore, Prof. Yusni Sabi assessed that the Jalin case had occurred in the Aceh region, namely the place where terrorist candidates were educated and prepared to carry out acts of terror. However, from several former Jalin Aceh actions, it turned out that they needed attention and wanted attention because they come from a group imported from West Java. At first, they invited young people to defend Palestine with a guarantee of a place and a supply of funds. Besides, this group in Aceh has links to the Aman Abdurrahman group alias Oman Rochman alias Abu Sulaiman. In other words, they have a very significant network and movement philosophy. They also had links with Umar Patek down to Abu Bakar Baasyir. Even so, the group that had participated in the training in Jalin Aceh had the same spirit of struggle as the international network even though it did not exist organizationally. As for the position of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Aceh region is known as one of the most violent groups and often condemns. However, in reality, FPI was built for political interests; FPI does not have an ideology like HTI. In this context, FPI is known only as an organization of Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar. However, specifically in Aceh, the FPI organization is somewhat different from the FPI in Jakarta. Meanwhile, according to Tengku Muslim At-Thahiry[3], the head of FPI Aceh, FPI's mission, in general, is under the statutes of enforcing the caliphate. Even so, there is a slightly different view of the Caliphate from other mass organizations. As for the Aceh region, the FPI position is in the second stage, namely the field of Hisbah, namely Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar. In other words, if an area has a lot of non-Muslim population, it is included in the field of preaching, for example carrying out this social action as part of FPI's preaching to the non-Muslim community. Meanwhile, the dynamics that occur in Aceh are more due to the playing of issues on social media, such as elements are attacking the Ulama and then some like to subdue the ulama. It is the same as cases abroad because there is often fighting between Sunnis and Shi'ites. However, because there is no Shi'a in Aceh, Ahlussunah and Wahabi are pitted against each other. Besides, FPI has proclaimed it an independent institution and wants no

conflict. However, previously the Aceh FPI had recruited paramilitary troop's candidates who were planning to be sent to Palestine. However, due to language barriers, many volunteers failed to leave for Palestine.

Meanwhile, after the peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (RI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), not all former GAM combatants received a decent life. Amid doubt and difficulty in obtaining sufficient economic access, FPI then recruited cadre candidates with the aim that the spirit they still had could be directed towards positive things. Finally, for the area of the radicalism movement in Aceh, according to Prof. Yusni's observations, it is not concentrated in several urban areas. However, substantively, the areas that are often used are Bireun Regency and Banda Aceh because Banda Aceh is the center of the provincial capital so that all groups want to show their existence.

The spread of radicalism in Aceh

This study describes several reasons behind the terrorist actors exposed to radicalism. Several former terrorists said that they were influenced by radicalism because they participated in recitation from Banda Aceh till they met Abu Fulan (pseudonym). As experienced by Andre Marlan[4], some combatants attended recitation at Abu Fulan's place, which was then sent to the Islamic da'wah academy on Gunung Tingkil- Bogor, West Java. His departure used his own accommodation for two months. During the recitation, the understanding taught was more of the jihadist movement and the Islamic movement. Furthermore, after studying there, only then returned to Abu Fulan's place in Aceh Besar. It indicates that the concept of radical Islam accepted by some circles is due to the lack of knowledge related to religion (Rokhmad, 2012).

Furthermore, during the recitation, according to Andre Marlan (2020), he never knew Ustadz Dulmatin who had become a DPO and was opposed by several countries, including Australia, because what Dulmatin knew was the figure of Ustad Hamzah. It is because the photos circulating on the DPO list are passport photos. Andre Marlan also knew that Al-Qaeda Serambi Mekkah would be formed because the strength was so adequate and many of those who took part in the training in Jalin were also former Afghans, such as Ustadz Hasan and Abu Thalud. Regarding the teachings for the suicide bombing, according to these combatants, they never actually agreed. Furthermore, Marlan said that they and the jihadists from Aceh had agreed not to carry out suicide bombings but would be willing if invited to fight.

Nevertheless, there were combatants from the Jalin group who had a relationship with Abu Fulan because most of the committee in Aceh were former trainees of Abu Fulan, such as Agam Fitriadi, Ustad Fuadi, Surya Akhda, and Marzuki, and Hasbudin, who died at the Jantho incident. Meanwhile, the rest were former FPI assistants who failed to go to Gaza. Meanwhile, another combatant, such as Taufik, told his story of being involved in a radical group in Aceh, starting from joining volunteer registration in Gaza. From here, Taufik got to know Teungku Yusuf and met Yusuf in Padang Tiji, Pidie Regency, who was also an ex-Afghan. Furthermore, according to Taufik's knowledge there are also ex-terrorist who are GAM sympathizers and have participated in it even though not too far involved. It is different from Teungku Mukhtar Ibrahim, who commented that his involvement in the radicalism movement in Aceh started

because he was involved in GAM even though he did not take up arms. At the end of the civil emergency (year 2001-2002), he often helped GAM, which eventually had to leave Aceh for Jakarta. During Tsunami and the Helsinki Agreement between RI and GAM, he was in prison in Jakarta because of drug problems and economic pressure. It concludes that radicalism is rooted in the existence of gaps in Indonesian society (Umar, 2010). Due to the various dynamics above, the sentiment of struggle naturally grew in his soul. Meanwhile, he recognized radicalism purely from reading and personal disappointment with the political dynamics in Aceh. This anxiety had become mental stress, and there was a place to express it through radical groups. As for radicalism, Tengku Mukhtar recognized that radicalism came from recitation or Tausiyah in prison, including learning Tajweed in prison. Also, Teungku Mukhtar mentioned that terrorism in Aceh has nothing to do with jihad in the Middle East, such as jihad in Afghanistan. Even though they are related to Gaza because of the volunteers recruited by the FPI to fight in Gaza, their movements stem from reading, not purely brought from Java. Furthermore, Teungku Mukhtar said that he did not know Dulmatin's names, because Dulmatin used the pseudonym; Ustadz Hamzah. As well Teungku Muslim Thahiry, Andre Marlan and Taufik. Even Yudi Zulfahri was a former Jalin, did not even know the one with them was Dulmatin.

Meanwhile, the meeting with Sofyan Tsauri (ex-terrorist prisioner) only happened when he accidentally needs a coach. The story began during a training session in the community; there were former GAM members who were not disciplined, structured, and unsystematic. Because the training sessions were not as good as army or police training, such as war simulations and other exercises, Teungku Yusuf (Aceh FPI Leader) then asked to find a new trainer and contacted Sofyan with the free accommodation costs. Meanwhile, Sofyan Tsauri's status was no longer a police officer and had left the police institution.

Efforts to Prevent Radicalism and Terrorism Networks

The development of terrorism networks will be closely related to the increasing spread of radicalism. To measure the spread of radicalism needs prevention strategies as early as possible. In the context of Aceh, a strategy that can be carried out is to formulate various joint efforts between the central, regional, and all components of society. One form of preventive measures undertaken is to believe in the role of the MPU. With the privileges given by the people of Aceh to the MPU, it is not wrong if the MPU has produced many legal fatwas to prevent the spread of radicalism.

One of the MPU's fatwas has now been elevated to qanun for fostering and protecting Aqidah. Also, the MPU has formulated the criteria for Ahlusunnah Waljama`ah under local Acehnese wisdom. Besides, the movement of Dayah ulama in Aceh is also necessary to strengthen the understanding of moderate Islam. It is one of the best options to reject accusations against Islam as a religion that uses violence to solve social inequality problems in the current era. In other words, the radicalism movement in Aceh has been prevented by the emergence of a moderate Islamic social movement chaired by Dayah clerics to prevent conflicts and social unrest due to religious sentiments, such as those occurring in West Asia and Africa.[5]

All of these steps are under the functions of the MPU, which include three functions consisting of issuing legal fatwas, providing Taushiyah or recommendations, and conducting regeneration of Ulama. Based on these authorities, the MPU then recommends to the government how to counter radicalism in Aceh. Based on observations, the role of the central government in preventing radicalism from socialization is quite good. However, in terms of implementation, it is still not optimal appearing on the efforts of the National Counterterrorism and Terrorism Agency (BNPT) to collaborate with the Peace Media Center (PMD) with its three websites, namely jalandamai.org, damailahindonesiaku.com, and peace.id to conduct education-related to radicalism (Kusuma & Azizah, 2018).

Terorists exist because the government does not have a solid basis for detecting the derivation of radicalism. The excesses of the government are not so sensitive to matters of radicalism that occur in the field. Therefore, the efforts from Ulama and religious experts must be performed in various approaches to make the government listen to the explanations of various parties and not just hearing from one-sided information. Prevention efforts have often been carried out through dialogue with community leaders. However, data collection is carried out through dialogue in forums or intelligence parties and community leaders, such as dialogue to obtain information on potential conflicts in the regions and their resolving patterns. Besides, the approach taken is still educational, such as through documentary film screenings.

Even so, there are people who think that the FKPT[6] is a representative of the BNPT even though the FKPT is only a forum. Also, for funding, the FKPT sources from BNPT funding while the local government or Kesbangpol could not finance the FKPT but could only create activities that involved FKPT, such as education on radical understanding and sources from the FKPT. Furthermore, there are many activities held as part of monitoring. FKDM[7] sometimes also goes to the regions to hold work meetings and dialogues. It is a form of monitoring carried out by local government. But unfortunately, sometimes, the data owned is impossible to spread and announce to the public. Call it a meeting or a very private meeting regarding the planned arrival of the President. From the meeting, some recommendations are then forwarded to the Regional Leadership Communication Forum (Forkopimda). So, not all information could be conveyed to the public. But unfortunately, so far, the public has judged this forum as not working.

Thus, it is not surprising that the de-radicalization program by the government has been ineffective because nothing serious to deal with. It is different from the BNPT, where several primary terrorist figures have been successfully fostered. Meanwhile, in the BNPT, there are drafter and none for the regions. In the regions, there is only FKPT, a forum whose scope of work is for monitoring but not supported by adequate data. Therefore, there is a serious forum that has an office or secretariat with financial support f serious studies can be made. Ideally, there should also be a Terrorism and Radicalism Research Laboratory. It is crucial so that there is modelling. More ironically, FPKT cannot get various information on activities, so when BNPT conducts FPKT activities, it often does not get this information. From these facts, the establishment of FKPT is only limited to socialization function and was not deeply involved in programs to prevent terrorism and radicalism. If the local government supports, FKPT is believed to be able to run more optimally. However, for the Aceh region, there is no strong

support from the local government. FPKT often uses the Provincial Kesbangpol as the secretary so that the offices and facilities at the Provincial Kesbangpol can be used. These are some of the obstacles faced by the FKPT in carrying out its preventive function so far. Therefore, in the context of local government, the attention of the Aceh government must continue to be increased because there has been no concern at all, and it is very different from the central government. There is also no government assistance in business capital at all. Whereas in the forum, there were criticisms for providing venture capital, such as 100 million, so that FKPT could carry out adequate and targeted activities. Besides, the coaching carried out for this forum is also not well organized, and even former terror convicts rearrested by the Densus because of particular cases and cause BNPT to be unable to do anything despite under the guidance of BNPT. BNPT can ask Densus 99 about the level of wrongdoing because there are also wrongly arrested cases.

On the other hand, we certainly appreciate Kesbangpol, which has succeeded in taking precautions in recent years through survey activities, strengthening of state defence, Focus Group Discussions (FGD), and dialogues that can be taken by various inputs from various parties. However, Prof. Yusni regretted the word "taming" used by the governor, regent, or mayor in suppressing acts or issues of radicalism. In other words, it is feared that the term can be assumed to be related to political interests because so far, there has been an assumption that claims that politicians maintain these groups for practical political interests. Even so, the information that states that parties are being ridden must be analyzed first, and then conclusions are drawn because the handling of acts of terrorism cannot be separated from political interests.

CONCLUSIONS

Aceh is one of the regions with the largest conflict history in Indonesia. The Free Aceh Movement is one of the conflicting groups in the Aceh. It is reasonable if this region is often used as a basis for building radical and separatist movements. Moreover, the presence of international movements such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has also contributed to enlarging this area to be used as a base for building the strength of radical groups. It is evidenced by the dismantling of the Jalin training ground in Aceh for radicalism groups. Many former combatants from the Free Aceh Movement have joined groups with international networks, such as Aman Abdurrahman alias Oman Rochman alias Abu Sulaiman. Furthermore, some of the causes of radicalism deployment, ranging from economic factors to individual factors, to participating in several jihadist recitations.

Based on this fact, future preventive steps must be strengthened by the local government by attracting all the knots of society, and Local governments must be able to maximize the function of FPKT as a communication forum for preventing radicalism. This forum must continue to be given a more autonomous authority because it is closer to the conflict area, and also its members come from convicts of terrorism.

Furthermore, the central and local governments are not only successful in disseminating radicalism but also must pay attention to the lives of former combatants who have been exposed, especially on the economic side. Without adequate welfare, these former terrorist

convicts may return to action. So, social assistance and capital to improve the economic welfare of ex-convicts may be necessary. Finally, the role of Islamic boarding school ulama (Dayah) and all community nodes must continue to be built to synergize with each other. Therefore, efforts to prevent the spread of radicalism can run optimally because all society components involvement in fighting terrorism can be a channel for maintaining the nation and state sustainability.

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Interviews

Interview with Tengku H. Faisal Ali, Deputy Chairperson of the Aceh Ulama Consultative Council (MPU) and Chair of the Aceh Regional Board of Nahdlatul Ulama (PWNU), on August 18, 2020.

Interview with Andre Marlan, former Terrorism Prisoner, on September 10, 2020

Interview with Dedy Andrian, Head of Conflict Management and National Vigilance, Aceh Kesbangpol Office and Head of the Aceh FKPT Secretariat, on August 24, 2020.

Interview with Prof. Yusni Sabi, Ph.D., Academician UIN Ar Raniry, former Chair of the Aceh FKPT for the period 2006-2014 on August 21, 2020.

Interview with Taufik, former Terrorism Prisoner, on September 10, 2020.

Interview with Tengku Mukhtar Ibrahim, a former Terrorism Prisoner and recipient of the mandate to establish FPI in Aceh. on September 12, 2020.

Interview with Teungku Muslim At-Thahiry, Pesantren Leader and Chairperson of FPI Aceh and recipient of the mandate for the establishment of FPI in Aceh, on September 4, 2020.

Interview with Dr. Fajri M. Kasem, Academician at Department of Sosiology university of Malikussaleh, Aceh. On October 27, 2020

Interview with Dr. Mukhlisuddin Ilyas, Academician and member of the Coordination Forum for Counter-Terrorism/FKPT-Aceh. On August 24, 2020