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Indonesia's Intra-State Conflict "Assessment of Former President Habibie and Wahid's Peace Solution on Aceh Province" Mr.Zulham Malikussaleh University

Lhohseumawe-Indonesia After the cold war came to an end, the international political landscape has changed as transformation from international conflict, in which the level of war is no more existing in the form of between one country and another, but it came up in the configuration of respected state with it is regions or so called intra-state conflict.

Background to occur such conflict is based on variety of reasons which eventually leads to the desire of region to separate from it is existing state. Thus Aceh one of the intra-state conflict which wants to free from Indonesia based on it is disappointment with the central government over it is political and policies decision. Thus, this paper examines Indonesia's peaceful policies on Aceh province, particularly in justifying it is own perspective over the region.

Before discussing in detailed, the author begins the discussion by the background of the Aceh conflict has put as crucial account to be discussed, later on the role of Indonesian presidents, like B.J.Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid are under the coverage of the explanation, in relating to their respective peace strategy over Aceh. Their strategies as well as policies are marked by persuasive and repressive approach, regardless of their initiation to peace talks as problem solving for Aceh case. Nevertheless, at the end of the paper, the conclusion gives the summary of the concerned discussion. Key words: Indonesia, Aceh, peaceful policies, Bj.Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid Introduction Up until the late nineteenth century, Aceh had been an independent sultanate that had continued as a sovereign state for almost 500 years.

From 1641 to 1824, the Aceh kingdom was at the center of a British-Dutch tussle and finally in 1824, Aceh was granted independence under the Anglo-Dutch treaty (Iyer, 2003). Then, the Dutch colonial achieved control of the archipelago only after a continuing war between 1873 and 1903. That led to the death of some 10.000 colonial armies and Aceh remaining unoccupied. In 1949, the republic of Indonesia was created from the Holland East Indies.

Indonesia, as Java-based government, attempted variously to consolidate control over Aceh region, labeling it as a part of Indonesia to the target of national and post-colonial unification and made Aceh as a new special province of the new country. Aceh agreed to join the Republic of Indonesia at time of independence much due to the promises of President Sukarno that Aceh would gain autonomy within the Republic which followed by the special region status.

Yet this promise was subsequently broken and Aceh was instead incorporated into the North Sumatra province (Bjornehed, 2003, p. 34). Disappointed by this status, the Acehnese have since then demanded separation from Indonesia by announcing themselves independent in 1953. Hasan Di Tiro, an Acehnese American educated background descendant of the sultan of Aceh who posted as the Acehnese ambassador to the United Nations during the house of Islam rebellion (Darul Islam) movement in the region, then their separatist movement quickly turned into an armed struggle, finally formed the organization in 1976, despite Hasan treated as the symbolic president of Free Aceh Movement (GAM) while exiled in Sweden since 1980 and delegating authority for routine operating group to Abdullah Syafei'i_ and replaced by Muzakir Manaf at present.

Initially GAM rebels started at low level guerilla in 1970s, but in 1980s GAM advantaged support from Libyan government in assisting weapon and training, the military equipment supply, which encouraged the movement escalation till challenged the war with the government of Indonesia between 1989 and 1990s (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001). Geographically, Aceh lies in the northernmost tip of Sumatra, across the Straits of Malacca from the border between Thailand and Malaysia.

The Acehnese have long conducted a celebration of proud independence, after long fought against the Netherland colonialist occupation and afterwards by the Javanese (ICG, October, 1999). This North-western region trip of Indonesia, almost 40.000 Indonesian armies, Javanese military and brigadier mobile police have deployed in this region, raping, torturing, and killing the innocent, and referendum on self-determination demanders became part of daily pictures in this archipelago.

Acehnese war for independence started in 1873 when, in negotiation to arrange the rest of archipelago, England shifted its hesitation to the Netherlands integrating the territory of sultanate into East Indies occupation. For almost 32 years war which caused loss of many Acehnese and Dutch colonial troops, finally Banda Aceh (Aceh province capital city) came into fall under Dutch control. But it didn't reduce the assault of Acehnese attack on colonial fighters.

In adaptation to the situation, the Acehnese changed its war aggression from open battle to guerilla war in the forests, mountains and remote villages. The indigenous society kept offensive battle on Netherland till Japan colonized Indonesia in 1942. Winning their war over the Dutch, Daud Beurueh (Acehnese guerilla leader) achieved the Aceh revolution.

Owing to their sympathy to Indonesia which was still under the rule of colonial Dutch, the Acehnese assisted the Indonesians by giving free aircraft known as a DC3 **in the form of** neighboring solidarity colonial victims to fight the remain of Dutch troops in Java. But the Acehnese's dream to be federation of state was disappointed in 1950, by the government in Jakarta.

Sukarno unilaterally declared the removal of the federal system as form of government and replacing it by a unitary form of state based on Jakarta's centralization and Java administration. Jakarta's provocateur decision made the emergence of secessionist movement in Aceh. The separatist movement started in 1976 in which the Acehnese announced its desire to be separated from Indonesia through its organization famously known as the Aceh Free Movement (GAM, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and officially sometimes it called as the **Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF)** (Kingsbury, 2003).

The Sukarno's negative decision treated as betrayal by the largest of Acehnese and this territorial sovereign dispute has been becoming main grass root of conflict reason up to now between Jakarta and Aceh. Every Indonesian President has been challenging to make certain political approach in countering and problem solving over Aceh.

The policies generally assumed the form of repression rather than persuasion. Military action is often used instead of political-social approach. Since the independent of Indonesia till the post of Suharto's authoritarian regime demise, this confronted physical policy is frequently appropriated. Nevertheless, leaders from President B. J.

Habibie to President Megawati Sukarnoputri have been authorizing use of weapons for eradicating the separatist guerillas instead of peace dialogue. For this reason, the author

felt that it is important to discuss the Indonesia's politics over Aceh to analyze that using the hardliner policies is never solve the problem vis-à-vis injected more radical behavior on Acehese and revenge amongst them to fight back any hard policies applied by Jakarta.

Two former Presidents' politics will be discussed in this topic, started from former president Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, since within the period of the followed presidents, the tension in Aceh has largely escalated and at the same time Indonesia has threatened by the political reform and democratic transition. The New Order's politics also put to be discussed as an important point in which the Acehese casualties more killed and smashed out during this military regime.

The May 1998 reform has stepped down the New Order authoritarian. In Aceh, thousands of students demanded for the end of Red Net Operation or Military Operation Area (DOM, Daerah Operasi Militer) which for long term imposed by Suharto's regime.

The student demonstration supported by the religious scholars, Acehese governor Syamsuddin Mahmud, lawyer associations and human right activist by sending a letter to the president B. J. Habibie through the commander of defense for the termination DOM that imposed by his predecessor Suharto. The year 1998 has also identically the Acehese awareness of their long political and social oppression period.

Many social movements came up and supported Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in this year, particularly after East Timor gained it is independent in 1999 from Indonesia, Acehese more enthusiastic to insist the government for referendum which leads to independence. Habibie's Strategy on Aceh After B. J. Habibie swore in as the third president, he planned specific concern on Aceh conflict separatist issues.

Basically the president came from the civilian academic background, which has no military knowledge and strategy expert to maintain security approach in Aceh. Based on his predecessor's influence, most of his cabinet ministers had been comprised of army domination. They were responsible under some important posts. It is likely all the military cabinet representatives had acted direct rule during the New Oder regime's military operation called Red Net Operations (DOM) imposed on Aceh. General Wiranto for instance, who was Suharto's presidential secretary and reappointed as TNI Commander of defense and security minister, L. G.

Faisal Tanjung for coordinating minister for political affairs and security, who was TNI Commander during the late DOM in Aceh and was to be suspected the main

responsibility for military human rights violation by Indonesian special forces in the region. Major General Syarwan Hamid, as home affair minister, was in charge as Chief Lhokseumawe Military Operations Command (Korem) during the early Aceh military operation.

Minister for transmigration and settlement of forest squatters was given to General A. M. Hendropriyono, Lieutenant General M. Y. Yosfiah, who was accused of human rights violation in East Timor military operation in 1974, was appointed as political information agent; while Colonel Sofyan Effendi was Lhokseumawe Military Operations Commander and replaced Syarwan Hamid in Aceh as education and cultural minister.

Major General Sintong Panjaitan as secretary of development operation and was special force commander in East Timor who blamed as Santa Cruz Massacre in Dili (East Timor Capital city before separated from Indonesia in 1999), Major General H. R. Pramono, who was the territorial strategy commander in Aceh and recruited number of Javanese civilian militias for fighting GAM (Free Aceh Movement), was placed in **the ministry of industry and trade**.

Lieutenant General Agum Gumelar, as the governor of National Resilience Institute who had in charged as intelligence commander in Aceh. All of these military personnel had been deeply involved and responsible to the Aceh conflict during Suharto's military regime from 1989-98. Habibie initiated some strategic options for peace settlement in the region, whether by the Suharto's classical security treatment again to be applied as repressive approach, by redeploying thousands of troops to secure the conflicted area, but in different form of military operation style rather than DOM that which imposed by the New Order.

There is an effort to regain Acehnese hearts and minds, by convincing them that Aceh is a part of Indonesia, ending Red Net operation, returning thousands of non-organic military soldiers from Aceh to their respective barracks and guaranty for amnesty to many Acehnese political prisoners (Miller, 2009). Minimizing Operation Zone During DOM, the military have increased elaborate and offensive operations, by the reason of counter-terrorism and protect of national integration, the armies created the violence aiming at justification to continue military presence oppression in this northern most of Sumatra.

Based on this justification, the Red Net Military Operations (DOM) extended up to nine years from 1989 till 1998. During this period the army started intensifying power of finding, detaining, and raping, that effectively allowed them to kidnap and torture the Acehnese without bringing to any law procedure. In addition to that, poorly trained

troops have frequently triggered assault into crowds of people, murdering and victimizing civilians.

This accumulated public emotion at the army's strategy which strengthened hostility toward central government and assisted empowering GAM at a time when the support had been mounted (International Crisis Group (ICG), October, 1999). Habibie instructed the commander of defense and security minister, General Wiranto announcing the End of DOM in 7 August 1998, subsequently the local internal security situation fully handed over to the Acehnese it self, police units, and TNI military resort (Garrison) commands.

Wiranto gave an order to North Sumatra Medan Military Command Area (Kodam Bukit Barisan I) for a one-month period to withdraw thousand non-organic troops from Aceh. The Medan-based Kodam Bukit Barisan I supervised the military commands and operations in Aceh prior to the establishment of Aceh Iskandar Muda Military Command Area in Banda Aceh.

Followed by Habibie's national delivery speech in 16 August 1998 in front of the Parliament, he apologized to the Acehnese on behalf of the Indonesian troops regarding their oppression and violence over the region during the military operation. He promised to bring into court any incidents violated by the national security officers and human right abuses. (Hamid, 2006).

To follow up this promise to judge the military human right criminals, he was fast responsive to Acehnese justice demanders and formed National Human Right commission (Komnas HAM), by delegating it is leader Baharuddin Lopa to Aceh in order to find the actual fact on the human right violation in the grounds. The Commission found nine of mass graves which five of those have been exhumed and sufficiently identical to prove indubitably that many innocent civilians had been killed during the military Red Net Operation (DOM).

According to the Acehnese research's field point of view, the commission said 781 deaths, 368 beaten, 163 lost and 3000 peoples widowed. In addition to that the author's observation is 20.000 to 4500.000 deaths, 6000 women widowed, hundreds of houses burnt and 8000 children were orphaned. The commission blamed the TNI has to be responsible for the mentioned deaths.

This most probably to be one of the hardest and complicated investigate of all to attain for Komnas HAM. The army will not accept any efforts to recall back and accused it is responsibility and subsequently the senior military commanders consistently to defend and deny any charge that against it is personnel guilty in the conflict zone (International

Crisis Group (ICG) October, 1999).

General Wiranto strongly opposed the human right commission's finding, urging this identification was structurally and intentionally aimed at provocation, to create the distrust of the Acehnese over TNI and government. TNI can not be asked for its past guilt. Negatively, it will reduce the bravery and patriotism of armies that led to their refusal of further national territorial protection (Hamid, 2006).

Colonel Dasiri Musna (former TNI Aceh Commander) strengthened Wiranto's argumentation by stressing human right commission data included the Acehnese death during Aceh's colonial war against the Dutch; furthermore, he ignored the availability of any mass grave of killing fields in this region (Miller, 2009). Ironically, while the human right commission was established, the Fact finding Team also came into being, particularly in 16 July 1998 (further legally approved by the Parliament decision dated 23 July 1998)._

This investigation team was headed by Lieutenant General Hari Sabarno (deputy leader of parliament) which consisted of 8 members of whom five members came from military and the remaining four persons were civilians; but technically the military has influenced indirectly this fact finding team, this apparently can be seen through this team's statement that the emergence of Acehnese secession movement was in response to the government's inequality and not disobedience to the Pancasila ideology and Indonesian unitary system.

The fact finding team's investigation further recommended the territorial security operation in substitute of DOM for the purpose of eradication of the rest of the Acehnese separatist movement. The author's observation there is a contradiction between the identification of the human right commission and the issue that released by the Fact finding team.

It supposed the Fact finding team should be focused on the human right violation in Aceh rather than stating political means and social circumstance there. Indirectly meaning, the Fact finding team's orientation is inclined to justify and blame the New Order Ret Ned Operation (DOM) was caused by the existence of Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

According to the author, there is strong counter effect and counter blaming conspiracy by the military commanders to escape from public allegation of their earliest roles in Aceh. The plan to establish human rights courts remains unsatisfactory, as the court procedure is unable to overcome incident of factual human right abuses in Aceh.

During the conflict, interconnecting courts have been formed that permitted the individual army to be arbitrated **on the basis of** evidence given in civil courts. This has only manipulated into a system or mechanism to protect the TNI, because these courts are inadequate to deeply investigate the violation further up the chain of command and continue after the superior instructor commanders who delegated the orders.

The broken judicial is mainly caused by the existence of Suharto's regime actors in positions of power (Farid, 2006). Operation Task Force Authority 99 Few days after withdrawal of non-organic troops from Aceh, the internal social conflict took place, looting the shops, demolishing government offices, national political parties' constituents offices, and burning some public hotels and including the public prison in Lhokseumawe._

This local dispute not only in districts but spread over all Aceh sub-districts. The national TNI center in Jakarta changed Lhokseumawe military resort commander 011/Lilawangsa Colonel Dasiri Musnar to Colonel Johnny Wahab to overcome the situation. GAM alleged that the TNI was responsible for creating mass violence by arguing all non-organic troops taken away from the region.

On the other hand, the TNI accused GAM as provocateur for the local unrest. In 2 November 1998 there was sweeping action by GAM members led by Ahmad Kandang, the sweeping targeted to find the organic military personnel in revenge the behavior of non-organic troops whom mistreated the Acehnese during DOM. TNI Major C.A.J.S.

Harahap was caught in the operation and executed along with his burnt car, followed by burning the Indonesian flags in every places they were found. In Bireun district GAM kidnapped seven Indonesian soldiers, slaughtered and threw them to the river. Two days later, another two more national soldiers were killed (Hamid, 2006). Observing from the uncontrolled circumstance, by January 1999 President B. J.

Habibie imposed another type of military operation upon Aceh, known as Operation Task Force Authority 99 (Operasi Satgas Wibawa 99), which automatically meant redeployment of non-organic troops into this conflicted region. The operation sealed all districts and sub-districts GAM sweeping, this operation method used torture civilians, just like the technique that used by the New Order's operation practice. From 1985 Aceh did not have **the Regional Military Command** Base (Kodam).

It has only two military resort commands (Korem), one the Lhokseumawe- based korem know as 011/Lilawangsa which in charge subordination and operations in eastern Aceh

and the Banda Aceh based Korem known as 012/Teuku Umar responsible for the western part of the region, while the police only have one Regional Police Headquarter (i.e., Mapolda), situated in Banda Aceh.

The districts and sub-counties ranges, the army and police both have commands called as military district command and Koramil for the TNI, and police district command and police area command for the police. During Operation Task Force Authority 99, many interrogation centers established by security forces, and used to intimidate and civilian execution.

Habibie couldn't control the situation, hence then many informal security actions actively exercised by the Indonesian troops out of the system for reconnaissance, and recruiting civilian militias (Miller, 2009). The civilian militias operated as army's sub-unit. In late 1989, total militia numbers were estimated to between 80.000 and 115000 members in the emergency conditions all over Indonesian regions.

These multi-militias supervised by the instruction of the command of the military area commander. Assisting military in battle against separatism movements, People's Security Force guerillas (Kamra, Keamanan Rakyat) and People's Resistance guerillas (Wanra, Perlawanan Rakyat), were led by trained civilian militia (Ratih, Rakyat Terlatih). The aim of Ratih was to handle both local aggression and internal rebellions.

This strategy was practiced in combating the East Timor rebellions, now this pattern of strategy has been replicating in Aceh (Kingsbury, 2003). Under this operation, the disputes not only erupted between military and civilians but occurred between armies themselves and blamed each other for the clashes. For instance, in February 1999 in Eastern Aceh, Idi cut massacre came to be Jakarta's concern while troops shot into group of civilian, during the tragedy, the army asked approximately 20 peoples onto lorry and pushed them to prove that the local police was did this killing.

According to public's outlook, the military and Habibie's administration reform was not serious to fulfill it is promise, which is no any differences between the strategy of the past authoritarian regime that treated Aceh in large. The result of this operation didn't solve the problem peacefully and vis-à-vis inspired many Acehnese to be integrated with Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Morally GAM has benefited from Habibie's policies on Aceh military operation. In addition to that, many Acehnese local organizations came in to being, such as on 24 March 1999 **Aceh Referendum Information Centre** (SIRA, Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh), followed by emergence of Union of Acehnese Students (Rabithah Taliban Aceh)

on 7 April 1999. Then Acehese Student for Coalition Action (Karma) too took shaped.

For Acehese independence, SIRA backed up by 80.000 Islamic boarding school students. The demand for independent increased, but human rights violations were still not solved. In response to the huge demonstration in Aceh, Habibie finally ended the Operation Task Force Authority 99 in February 1999; and reassessed his policy towards Aceh.

But it seems to be late for ending the military approach when the Acehese society has deeply supported the independent for the province since the security approach undertaken by the Habibie's regime. Abdurrahman Wahid One month after president Wahid came to power, on November 8, 1999, thousands of Acehese protesters moved up to Aceh's provincial capital of Banda Aceh to declare for an independent referendum.

The province is one of Indonesia's provinces which demanded greater reform, and yet Acehese have remained largely alienated from Jakarta, feared by ranks of human right violation, backwardness and economic degradation. Subsequently the Free Aceh Movement rebels (GAM) advantaged this situation gaining more strong support from the peoples.

In dealing with this matter, Wahid decided Aceh as his main task policy as fast as he got his presidential ascendancy. He promised to withdraw non-organic army and execute the accused human rights committers, irrespective of their status. To back up his policy, it is for the first time in the Indonesian cabinet minister, the minister of human rights came into being under Wahid.

To show up his big concern relating human rights abuses, he chose an Acehese Hasballah Saad as the concerned minister. On November 6, 1999, the troop withdrawal took place form the region, while many Acehese believed battalions of army still remain in this conflict region (Cohen, 18 November, 1999). Beside that Wahid initiated to open peace talks, he didn't rely much on military approach. He declined to use the words 'operation' and 'military'.

Treating the security unrest in Aceh, this fourth president still rejected the TNI's request to approve 'state emergency' while his vice president Megawati Sukarnoputri was in favor of hard military approach as the final option to secure Aceh dispute. Wahid refused to do so, due to the experience of range of brutal army crackdowns in earlier 1990's, which not only vandalized the local building construction but traumatized Aceh people that led to motivate the movement to separate from Indonesia's heavy handed rule (Mc Beth, 2001, April 12).

From the point of view proclaimed by Wahid, it indicated there was a soft strategy towards the separatist issue in this most northern region. President Wahid decided to open the possibility of holding dialogue with GAM'. In the beginning many GAM members, and Indonesian government senior officers particularly Military were reluctant and refused this prospect.

Henry Dunant Center (HDC) sent it is representative to meet Abdurrahman Wahid and assured that they are able to facilitate both the belligerents to sit together for settling the dispute. Wahid agreed and hold a meeting with HDC on January 30, 2000 and requested HDC to become mediator in future peace talks. From this point of view the HDC played it is role as neutral facilitator this intrastate conflict.

Besides the military, Wahid also faced strong opposition from Indonesian nationalist, by assumption that the involvement of international community would enlarge the existence of GAM and it is recognition (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). **The Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause** (JUHP) Agreement. **One of the most** difficult tasks faced by Abdurrahman Wahid after gaining the president power was the greatest demand for independence in Aceh province; moreover, his ambiguous and contradictory speeches motivated Acehnese to disintegrate from Indonesia.

For instance, in November 1999 after he sworn as president, he made series of ambiguous press releases regarding referendum in Aceh and confused most national political elites, granting the region to decide it's future just like East Timor [which has separated from Indonesia after performing regional referendum]. **On the other hand,** Wahid also stressed referendum in Aceh to be part of unitary Indonesia (ICG, February 2001).

Following a massive demonstration rally by Acehnese for independence, Wahid welcomed peace talks. A turning point in the hostilities took place in 1999, when **the Henry Dunant Center** (HDC), which later amended its name to the, a In 1999, there was a serious turning point in the hostilities when the erstwhile Henry Durant Center or HDC amended its name to Humanitarian Dialogue Center.

It was a new, independently financed NGO which is focusing on humanitarian peace dialogue, and it found Aceh as a place for involvement. Martin Griffiths, HDC director and former United Nations assistant secretary-general for human rights and Lousia Chan-Boegli, a physician who has worked **the United Nations High Commission on Refugees** a long time ago, were at the point of HDC target in Aceh.

HDC says it is intervention in Aceh as a good opportunity, particularly after a visit by Chan-Boegli to East Timor where the organization firstly observed the case study from East Timor and designated it in to the Acehese future peace frame work after it was identified as having the potential for dispute escalation as East Timor before separated in 1999, and intensively because it is crucial issue for the region and the future political stability in Indonesia (Leary, 2004).

This Switzerland based-organization arranged meeting on 12 May 2000, Indonesian government was delegated by Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda (Indonesian United Nations Ambassador in Geneva) and Dr. Zaini Abdullah (Free Aceh Movement health Minister) agreed that the three-month ceasefire created a 'humanitarian pause'.

The agreement was called 'The **Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause** in Aceh' (International Crisis Group (ICG), December, 2000). The dealt agreement covered of two main objectives, first is, the **provision of security modalities with** an idea to backing up the **delivery of humanitarian assistance** and to eliminating the conflict and violence which may cause other victims.

Second, is humanitarian action and security modalities aiming at **delivery of humanitarian assistance to** the victimized Acehese and any other population in Aceh who affected by the violence situation. Confidence building is also made as part of initial peace process to facilitate next peace agreement (Bjornehed, 2003). The accord came into effect on June 2, 2000 aimed at ending all hostilities between the belligerent. The JUHP extended further until 15 January 2001.

As **violations by the Indonesian side increased**, however, attacks by GAM on armies and police also mounted. **The pause was renewed twice** (Human Right Watch (HRW), August, 2001). GAM saw the peace talks as a chance to show its legitimate existence as a recognized movement in from of the Acehese as well as international communities (Harish, 2005). Within the Humanitarian Pause, Peace Zones were established even though it is not included in the point of agreement.

There are three main important bodies created under JUHP agreement which responsible for **the implementation of the** agreement and the establishment of peace zones. First is called the Joint Forum (JF) it is the highest body had representatives from **the Indonesian Government and GAM** with the HDC acting as facilitator. This forum was to oversee **the implementation of the humanitarian pause** and comment on the basic policies to be adopted.

Second is the Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action (JCHA) was to implement the

policies laid out by the Joint Forum. This committee was also responsible for fundraising for humanitarian assistance, it was to comprise of 10 members (maximum)-five from each side, facilitate by HDC. The committee was to be supported by a Monitoring Team **consisting of 5 persons** of high integrity agreed both parties.

The third is, the Committee on Security Modalities (JCSM), to ensure that there was an actual reduction of tension and cessation of violence. Committee members were responsible for making all the practical and logistical arrangements regarding movement of troops, enforcement of law and maintenance of public order. The committee comprised 10 members-five from each side, also facilitated by the HDC.

The committee was to be supported by a Monitoring Team **consisting of 5 persons** of high integrity agreed by both parties of high integrity agreed by both parties. The HDC focused on ways to develop security as the main step to reach ceasefire on its priority. In 2001 both disputants agreed to set up exploratory Peace Zones in two districts, Bireun and North Aceh District._

The areas were seen as the first phase toward demilitarization. An unpredictable event occurred that after peace zones were set up, the HDC members were intimidated and the police and military, which instigated it, got involved in a war with GAM. Then the HDC members withdrew **at the end of the first** week (Iyer, 2003, p. 8-9).

Acehnese could see **the future of the** peaceful resistance and the international community acknowledged the humanitarian pause accord. America and of European Union member countries supported the Indonesian-GAM peace permanently. But unlikely the Acehnese and other international governments which appreciated this peace agreement, the Jakarta paid less respect to the accord.

Wahid faced sophisticated criticism amongst the Indonesian political elites. The speaker of Indonesian parliament for instance, Akbar Tanjung who against the peace agreement not necessarily to be proceeded in overseas and not to be signed **by the Indonesian ambassador** alone but by involved more high authorized national officer and politicians.

Other members of the parliament argued to refused any accord made by Wahid, his ministers prior to the parliament's approval. None the less, the military which from the **beginning strongly opposed Wahid's peace approach to Aceh**, by stressing that **the humanitarian pause agreement** was weak memorandum of understanding and treated GAM as an equal agent with TNI and Indonesian police.

TNI strongly warned Wahid that Aceh should not be like East Timor in which got

independent due to the involvement of International actors earliest (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). However, by November 2000, the condition in Aceh had become more uncertain and the HDC pushed hard to bring both disputants to move plans for political dialogue ahead although with limited success. **The government of Indonesia** prepared autonomy for Aceh but didn't involve GAM.

On the other hand the TNI eagerly refreshed its military deployment in case GAM still favored independence as an option in it is peace talk and if the negotiation went to deadlock (Leary, 2004). On the ground, the humanitarian pause could not deter conflict, due to the fact that both sides often attacked the ceasefire agreement. The situation worsened in March 2001 when Exxon Mobile **Oil and Gas company** stopped its operation due to the unrest and its employees being targeted for attack.

There had been various assaults on the plant equipments. Large number of human rights crimes of the military period were identified, the involvement of Exxon Mobile in intimidating and abducting Acehnese was also unearthed. Hatred against Exxon Mobile employees and dissatisfaction over distributing revenues with the Indonesian government caused **Exxon Mobile to become** the second target of GAM assaults after the military posts. Large number of troops was redeployed to safeguard the Exxon Mobile company (Iyer, 2003).

Moreover, the two disputants have different interpretation regarding the accord itself. While the agreement mostly to be focused on memorandum for humanitarian understanding. But Abdurrahman Wahid looked the accord to be an agreement on humanitarian values to cease military conflicts.

On the other hand, that is GAM understood the agreement as being formally recognition of its existence as a political organization by the Indonesian government. GAM also deemed the agreement to be first chance in strategy that would lead to the independence of Aceh (Bjornehed, 2003). For **a few months after** signing of the HP, violence in Aceh decreased; but this escalated again in September.

The situation continued to worsen and it became increasingly difficult for humanitarian NGOs to carry out their work (Harish, 2005). Unfortunately, the term of the accord wasn't as long as the Acehnese had hoped it would be. The problems came up after one month Humanitarian Pause came into effect, for instance GAM and Indonesian government didn't meet substantial agreement points sort of which covered the limitation of cease fire and whether using GAM flags by its members treated as guilty of breaking the rule.

In addition the government had promised to withdraw its troops, but practically the armies still involved in patrol and replaced police function to combat GAM. In fact one of the accord points has insisted the organic police to be functioned for law and order enforcement and securing public institution, security patrol and arrest of armed civilians. Thus the accord finally met stalemate and failed (Aspinal & Crouch, 2003).

Military Operation for Restoring Security and Upholding the Law. (Through the Presidential Instruction No. 4/2001). Notwithstanding the ongoing dialogue in Switzerland has been taking place, the continuing war also takes place on the ground. In mid 2001 Wahid started to face his political instability within the country.

the national parliament motioned against him, which has had direct impact on the Aceh peace talks in Switzerland. Wahid lost his allies' support within the parliament which led to his presidential impeachment, for being accused of corruption. Thus the Indonesian generals and other Jakarta hardliners assumed Wahid had acted deep and far in consolidating GAM, which subsequently would utilize the chance to take over control of next Aceh policy decisions. The military has no more subjugation to the president in dealing with Aceh.

The TNI has acted silently to redeploy 30.000 troops to Aceh without Wahid's consent. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who was Wahid's **Coordinating Minister for political and security** affairs, and supported peace talks negotiation in advance, flagged an end to HDC involvement in the process. By February 2001 the peace dialogue took place in Banda Aceh between the field commanders. The Defense Minister Mahfud. M.D.

reasserted that GAM would maintain independence as a final option and they would enforce hardest action against rebellions. Even though in late of April the two disputants will continue next talks in Tokyo, **at the end of** March the Indonesian parliament offered full support to enforce security approach. Finally, under the TNI pressure, President Abdurrahman Wahid signed a Presidential Instruction No.

4 of 2001 on April 11 about comprehensive steps to settle the Aceh case. This comprehensive operation theoretically encompassed socio- political matters, economy, law enforcement, information and communication, public order and security However, in ground reality, the operation appeared to be dominated by the security approach as it was prioritized by the federal government in the Aceh conflict resolution instead of the other aforementioned programs.

Within a month after imposition of presidential instruction, the security situation more worsened than earlier DOM operations during Suharto's era. The military launched

range of attacks not only on the GAM as a target but mostly civilians have been casualties. The peace talk ended without solution, it strengthened by Geneva meeting on 30 June and 1 July 2001 in which the Indonesian delegation Hassan Wirajuda said the government had cancelled **the Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause** (JUHP) agreement (Aspinal & Crouch, 2003).

The new military operations were to eliminate some 3000 GAM fighters while insisting the rebels into accepting a special autonomy compromise. While police performed operations in Aceh's urban areas, the TNI and Brimob deployed counterinsurgency attacks in suburb and isolated areas and the Navy and Air force troops were functioned **in the Malacca Straits** to patrol GAM's weapons shipment from Southern Thailand (Miller, 2009).

In support of this operation, the new troops also embarked systematically to GAM strongholds and headquarters. Central Aceh was the place where violence increased, with the army blaming that GAM has murdered more than 40 Javanese migrants. In response, GAM claimed that the military together with migrant Javanese militias had killed ethnic Acehnese in Central Aceh. (Human Right Watch (HRW) August, 2001).

Thus the ongoing military operation under the Presidential Instruction No. 4 of 2001, led to social and political crackdown in the region. Conclusion In 1999, after **the fall of Suharto's** regime, President B.J. Habibie came into power and did nothing for serious Aceh conflict resolution, because he was dependent **under the influence of** Suharto's military loyalist, he was finally unable and unwilling to enforce local autonomy as well as sentence the military responsible for human rights crimes in the conflict region.

After Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid became as fourth Indonesian president as well as Indonesia's first democratically elected president. However, similar to Habibie's situation, Wahid challenged opposition from the hardliner military generals and was ultimately unable to provide concrete policy. From that period on, there have been **serious attempts to bring** an end to this protracted violent conflict in late 1999 and July 2001.

Even though, talks **between the Indonesian government and** GAM have continued over the years in spite of many breakdowns and serious setbacks (Iyer, 2003), While the Indonesian government saw this dialogue as an alter native to it is previous reliance on the security approach to manage the violence in Aceh, GAM saw it as yet another tool in it is struggle for independence (Schulze, 2004, p. 44).

The Humanitarian Pause agreement was the outcome of Wahid's political will to solve

Aceh conflict. However, the fall of Wahid brought **one of the most** chaotic periods of Indonesia's post-authoritarian transition to an end. Planned to promises of sweeping political change, Wahid's presidency collapsed under massive conflicts within the elite particularly military, and ultimately left mixed legacies for **democratic consolidation and civil-military** relations.

On the other hand, Abdurrahman was responsible for **some of the most** innovative policy initiatives ever presented by an Indonesian leader, including offers of fresh negotiations with the **separatist movements in Aceh** (Mietzner, 2006, p. 31-32). The result of January 2001 negotiation was successfully proposed confidence-building step in discussing Aceh's political future for the first time.

The two disputants promised themselves to a one month moratorium that benefited as a successor to the Humanitarian Pause (HP). For GAM, independence meant the freedom to ensure Acehnese identity and to maintain Aceh's future, like to decide what kind of government to be formed later, self-rule, economically, politically, cultural and international relations.

GAM has changed its position by transforming itself from independence demand to political movement, which would involve in the local **free and fair election** within Aceh. GAM shift becoming political movement would also benefit them to continue their aspirations. It meant changing of their strategy from forest struggle to ballot box.

On the other hand, **the government of Indonesia** considered GAM political shift as a gain as success. However, this peace talks didn't meet the agreement because of mutual mistrust and due to the proposal inconsistent endorsement from Indonesia. Thus, GAM involvement in the local election followed by autonomy, its transformation from insurgency movement into political activity, reduction of hostile acts, and the disarmament of weapons failed (Leary, 2004). References -Aspinall, Edward and Harold Crouch. (2003). The Aceh peace process: Why it failed.

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